In developing this argument, the article proceeds through four sections. The first part mounts a literature review to ascertain the main positions in the scholarship regarding Canberra's reasons for the intervention. My conclusion from this review is that while Australia's perceived responsibility to arrest state failure and instability in the South-West Pacific region is emphasised by some authors, the link to reputation is not adequately made. Based on historical evidence, the second part of the article argues that the Howard government was justified in claiming a special managerial responsibility for the South-West Pacific region on behalf of its traditional Western allies. The third part of the article highlights the close connection between Australia's historical responsibility for order in its region and the reputational norms of the international community during the War on Terror. The fourth section substantiates these claims through an analysis of the Howard government's statements during the Solomon Islands crisis, from the coup in Honiara in June 2000 until RAMSI was deployed in July 2003.
The literature on RAMSI
A decade after its deployment, RAMSI has generated a burgeoning literature. Much of it is concerned, primarily, with the state-building process and its problems, and does not directly engage with the themes discussed here (see, for example, Dinnen 2008a; Dinnen and Firth 2008; Moore 2007b; Morgan and McLeod 2006; Wainwright 2006) . A number of scholars analyse the Solomon Islands crisis, intervention and state-building 'package' predominantly from the local perspective, rather than from Australia's (see Dinnen 2008b; Dinnen and Firth 2008; Fraenkel 2004; Moore 2004 Moore , 2007a Moore , 2008a Moore , 2008b Nanau 2008 ).
An important position in the literature is centred on the work of Shahar Hameiri. Using RAMSI as a key example, Hameiri has developed a theory of neo-liberal 'state transformation', culminating with the 2010 book Regulating Statehood. Hameiri's argument is that state-building in 'fragile' states, with its focus on 'capacity', is not a neutral, technocratic process. Rather, it 'constitutes a political and ideological mechanism' for 'state transnationalisation' in line with dominant neo-liberal models of governance and development (Hameiri 2009, 57Á58) . Within this framework, Hameiri (2010, 157) argues that: 'RAMSI should be understood and evaluated as a multilevel regime of state transformation, which aims to fundamentally circumscribe political choices for Solomon Islanders by opening up transnational-regional spaces of governance within the state'. Australia's interests have presumably been bound up in this neo-liberal project of governance and state transformation since at least the 1997 Asian financial crisis. So, while valuable in illuminating the ideological context of Australia's recently intensified South Pacific engagement, Hameiri's work sheds little light on the motives for why the Howard government intervened in the Solomon Islands when it did.
Along similar lines, Clapton (2009) posits a post-cold war move from a pluralist to hierarchical international society based on relative capacities for liberal-democratic governance. For Australia, particularly after the 2002 Bali bombings, this resulted in heightened attention to the possibility of state failures in its region, which was 'reflected in the decision to intervene in the Solomon Islands in 2003' (Clapton 2009, 422) . Mckibbin (2009) and Lambach (2006) draw on Duffield's (2001) 'securitisation of development' thesis to explain Australia's intervention. Allen and Dinnen (2010, 302) ultimately account for RAMSI as a case of the 'local North' seeking to 'impose a liberal peace over a deviant and unruly neighbour' in the global South. But whether focused on risk management, capacity-building, the securityÁdevelopment nexus or the liberal peace, these explanations all fail to recognise that Australia's reputation among its peers is deeply implicated in promoting these norms of international order in its sphere of responsibility.
Most analyses of the Howard government's direct motives for RAMSI tend to posit an unprioritised mix of factors (see, for example, Dinnen 2004; Fullilove 2006; McDougall 2004; Moore 2005) . These include the global security climate of transnational threats prevailing after 9/11 and the Bali bombings; the humanitarian imperative; the risk of instability spreading throughout the Melanesian 'arc'; the ineffectiveness of Australia's previous aid policies; pressure from civil society, the media, think tanks and academics; and as a justification for the Howard government to avoid committing more troops to Iraq. Australia's international reputation is implicated in a number of these factors, but none of these authors develop this line of enquiry.
In addition, Wainwright (2003 Wainwright ( , 2004 emphasises the strategic dimension for Australia. Vulnerable 'failing' states in the region were a potential power vacuum that could be filled by foreign interests such as China and Taiwan. This is a recent variation of the long-standing Australian aspiration for a South Pacific 'Monroe Doctrine', which stretches back to the colonial era and was termed 'strategic denial' during the cold war (Herr 1984, 185) . Most importantly for the argument here, Wainwright (2004, 124Á126) also makes the point, although it is not developed, that Australia's 'diplomatic standing' was at stake. Canberra had an international responsibility to do something about such a high level of political and civil disorder on its 'doorstep'. I argue below that the Howard government's perceptions of Australia's reputation became closely linked during the War on Terror to Canberra's responsibility to keep order in its region on behalf of its 'coalition of the willing' allies.
A final position in the literature argues that Australia's official motives for the intervention*to prevent transnational threats from the Solomon Islands by restoring law and order and rebuilding the machinery of government*were largely disingenuous. In this view, RAMSI was driven almost exclusively by considerations external to the Solomon Islands. Dobell (2008, 58) argues that RAMSI was a result of the intersection between 'a new set of fears about terrorism and the threat that could emerge from failed states' and Australian policy makers' cumulative experiences in dealing with 'Melanesia-style' issues. Kabutaulaka (2005, 296) notes that failed state discourses at the global level of the War on Terror were a comfortable fit with the typically negative images held by the Australian policy community, journalists, conservative think tanks and some academics about a corrupt and incompetent 'arc of instability' in Melanesia (see, for example, Reilly 2000 Reilly , 2004 Reilly and Wainwright 2005) .
Building on these observations, Fry and Kabutaulaka (2008, 24) make two further important points that I seek to develop in this article by making the link to Australia's reputation as a central motive for the Solomon Islands intervention. They first argue that the War on Terror had 'a significant influence' in altering 'international norms concerning state-building intervention'. The interventionist norms that coalesced in the 1990s around democratisation and humanitarianism were superseded at the height of the War on Terror by those of preventing state failure, transnational terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and promoting 'good' governance as the cure for these problems. This shift is consistent with the historical pattern identified by Finnemore (2003) *namely, that the purpose of armed interventions changes over time in line with changes in the norms of international order. And, as I argue below, for satisfied, status-quo powers such as Australia, there is a strong association between upholding international norms and a state's reputation.
Secondly, Fry and Kabutaulaka (2008, 25) state that the Howard government's repeated assertion of its 'special responsibility' for the region was 'a strong part of its legitimating claim to the international community'. I demonstrate in the following section that there is a compelling historical justification for Australia's claim of responsibility to manage state failure and transnational security risks in the South Pacific region on behalf of the West. Fry (2008, 76Á78) also canvasses some of the mix of factors identified above. He concludes, however, that it was developments 'in the ''war against terror'' at the global level and Australia's response to it and to the associated alliance politics that was the determining factor' (Fry 2008, 78) . I agree with Fry, but seek to show in the remainder of the article that the motive of reputation is the key to understanding how developments in the War on Terror at the global level could translate into armed Australian action in the peripheral South-West Pacific region.
Australia's responsibilities in the South-West Pacific
This section makes an empirical case to support the often-cited 'perception' that Australia has a special responsibility for order and security in the South-West Pacific. Australia's responsibilities in the South Pacific on behalf of its allies date from five agreements and treaties established in the aftermath of World War II. For Canberra, these post-war strategic agreements initially sought to re-establish an independent British Commonwealth position in the area, with Australia at its centre (McLean 2006, 71) . But by the early 1950s, British Commonwealth objectives had become firmly integrated with global US cold war strategy. Prior to this, the Australian colonies, and the Commonwealth after 1901, had periodically sought to extend British imperial control in areas of the Pacific and to exert a more independent influence in nearby islands, but these initiatives were all undertaken within an empire framework (see Thompson 1980) .
The geographical area of responsibility that Australia claimed towards the end of World War II, and which was recognised later by its allies, was based on the wartime theatre sectors of the South-West and South Pacific. The SouthWest Pacific included insular South-East Asia, the Australian continent and New Guinea. The South Pacific encompassed the remainder of Melanesia, New Zealand and Polynesia. This area of responsibility was gradually redefined during the 1960s to cover the more limited area of Papua New Guinea and the non-French parts of the South Pacific. This shift in geography was due to the ending of Australia's forward deployments to cold war conflicts in East Asia, Suharto's consolidation of power in Indonesia and the incorporation of West Papua, and an emerging post-colonial awareness of South-East Asia as a discrete region (Fry 1997, 184Á186) .
After the tide had turned against Japan in 1943, Australia moved quickly with New Zealand in staking a claim to the post-war management of the SouthWest and South Pacific. The ANZAC Pact, also known as the Canberra Pact, was signed on January 21, 1944. It stated that within 'a general system of world security, a regional zone of defence comprising the South West and South Pacific areas shall be established' by the signatories. This zone would 'be based on Australia and New Zealand, stretching through the arc of islands North and North East of Australia, to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands' (DFAT 2011). The agreement was, in part, directed against the possibility that other powers*presumably the USA*might claim sovereignty over Pacific territories that had been occupied or used as bases during the war (DFAT 2011, Article 16; see also Ball 1944, 220; Grattan 1961, 194; Olssen 1944) . The signatories asserted that they must be party to any agreement whereby territorial sovereignty or the 'system of control' was changed from the pre-war status quo (DFAT 2011, Article 27) .
The first formal arrangement by which Australia was designated an area of responsibility by its allies was the UKUSA intelligence agreement of 1947Á1948. Ball (2001, 50) argues that this relationship remains at the core of the AustraliaÁUSA alliance and 'Australia's most important strategic asset'. Signed in 1947, the UKUSA Agreement includes the UK, USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and denotes a series of secret 'agreements, exchanges of letters and memoranda of common understandings' (Richelson and Ball 1985, 142) . Australia is specifically tasked under the agreement with intelligence responsibility for the eastern Indian Ocean, parts of South-East Asia* predominantly Indonesia*and the South-West Pacific (Richelson and Ball 1985, 142Á143) .
Despite the expanding ties with Washington, the British Commonwealth connection still retained significant emphasis. In 1950, the ANZAM region was delineated between the UK, Australia and New Zealand, independent of the USA. ANZAM established a naval defence area covering the eastern Indian Ocean and the Malayan (Malaya, Borneo, Indonesia and Dutch New Guinea) and AustraliaÁNew Zealand areas (Papua New Guinea and the Pacific south of the equator and west of 1708) (US Government Printing Office 1954, 225; Millar 1965, 69Á70; 'Radford/Collins Agreement' 2007) . The ANZAM Agreement gave British recognition to the areas of responsibility delineated earlier in the ANZAC Pact. The AustraliaÁNew Zealand area specified in the 1950 ANZAM Agreement is equivalent to the South-West Pacific region from Papua New Guinea to Fiji that Australia currently claims as a sphere of responsibility.
In March 1951, the ANZAM area of responsibility was recognised by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Admiral Radford, on behalf of the USA. The 1951 RadfordÁCollins Agreement was revised in 1957 and remains in effect today. Boundaries between ANZAM and US spheres of responsibility were designated and command and control coordinated ('Radford/Collins Agreement' 2007; Sea Power Centre Australia 2007). That the agreement was entered into by Australia under Rear Admiral Collins, rather than a Royal Navy representative, shows that Australia's interests in the Pacific, and its relationship with the USA, were eclipsing those of a declining Britain. The RadfordÁCollins Agreement is seen by Washington 'as constituting an Australian obligation' under the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), which was signed in September 1951 (Mediansky 1987, 157) .
ANZUS does not deal specifically with spheres of responsibility, but, over time, tacit understandings have developed (Young 1994, 196) . Some of the clearest public statements of this from the US side were articulated in a 1978 US Senate hearing of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. In response to a question about ANZUS cooperation in the South Pacific, Richard Holbrooke, then assistant secretary of state, said that: 'It is our belief that at the present time, Australia and New Zealand still carry, and should carry, the larger percentage of the responsibility in the region' (United States Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 1978, 9; see also Herr 1983, 279Á280; 1984, 186Á188) . This understanding of Australia's responsibilities was reflected in the incoming Hawke Labor government's 1983 review of ANZUS. Foreign Minister Hayden reiterated that the alliance 'is a commitment of national and mutual responsibility. It is our duty to discharge those responsibilities prudently if we are to sustain the Treaty' (Parliament of Australia 1983, 859).
The formal 'divorce' of New Zealand from ANZUS in 1986 did little to change regional responsibilities in a practical sense (Young 1988, 781Á783) . And while Australia has been keen to demonstrate that it is not a direct surrogate for the USA in the South Pacific, its 'shared regional interests' have tended to ensure that Australia's 'influence is generally directed at objectives serving U.S. and broader Western interests' (Dorrance 1992, 111) . The 1987 Defence of Australia White Paper reaffirmed 'Australia's natural association with the Western community of nations' and its 'attendant defence interests and obligations' (Commonwealth of Australia 1987, 10).
All of the above agreements and treaties remain in place. They designate and specify for Australia a range of defence and security responsibilities in the South-West Pacific*both explicit and tacit*on behalf of the West. It is a reasonable conclusion to draw from this survey that Australia, under the Howard government, was historically justified in claiming a managerial responsibility in the South-West Pacific region on behalf of its traditional allies*the then 'coalition of the willing'.
The Howard government: responsibility and the War on Terror
This section establishes the close connection between the Howard government's perception of its responsibility for keeping order in the South-West Pacific and the reputational norms of the liberal-democratic core of the international community with which Australian governments closely identify. The Howard government's approach on coming to office in 1996 placed greater emphasis than its Labor predecessor on the US alliance over Asian regionalism, bilateral relations over multilateral forums, and the explicit linking of 'national values' to foreign policy (Baldino 2005, 189) . The orientation of Australia's foreign policy at the time of the Solomon Islands intervention is best encapsulated by the White Paper released in June 2003.
In the wake of 9/11, the War on Terror and the 2002 Bali bombings, the 2003 White Paper leads with 'values' rather than 'interests'. Australia is identified as 'a liberal democracy with a proud commitment to political and economic freedom' (DFAT 2003a, 2Á3). The democratic peace theory is enunciated in the statement that Australia has a long tradition of defending and promoting liberal democracy around the world, thus contributing to a safer and more secure world. The promotion of liberal-democratic values was demonstrated in the East Timor intervention and participation in the war against terrorism. Australia's deep links with other Anglosphere countries are based on 'trust' (ibid.), presumably absent or in lesser supply with other states.
The White Paper claims 'special responsibilities' (92) in the South Pacific and, in strategic terms, argues the long-standing view that 'instability in the South Pacific affects our ability to protect large and significant approaches to Australia' (93). The South-West Pacific is singled out as a region in which Australia sees a direct risk to its security interests: the region's small and weak states face 'daunting political, economic and social problems and rising levels of discontent and crime' (DFAT 2003a, 23) . These increasing problems and South Pacific states' vulnerability as potential transit points for transnational crime and terrorism are attributed to poor 'governance' (ibid.). The assumption that fragile states and poor governance in the South Pacific could be a tangible security risk to Australia is explainable only through the prism of the War on Terror and Canberra's close alignment with Washington. This assumption is also buttressed by Australia's strategic culture, which views stability in the archipelagic SouthEast Asian and South-West Pacific regions as a vital security interest in denying the penetration of extra-regional powers (Ayson 2007, 222Á223) .
The prominence assigned to the Solomon Islands by Canberra in mid-2003 was closely linked to how Australia sees its position and role in the unipolar system. From Canberra's perspective, as a close US ally in a low-priority region, Australia is expected to play a managerial role in line with Washington's international order preferences (Albinski 2002, 157) . The historical evidence outlined above strongly supports this perception. In the post-9/11 era, promoting international order norms of good governance in Australia's 'patch' became a matter of reputation vis-à -vis the USA and the liberal-democratic core of the international community. The remainder of the article demonstrates how the Howard government's reputational concerns in the War on Terror intersected with its historical responsibility for maintaining order in the South-West Pacific region, leading to the intervention in the Solomon Islands.
Responsibility and reputation in the Solomon Islands crisis
This section examines the period from the coup in Honiara of June 5, 2000 until the intervention took place on July 24, 2003. I show that Canberra initially viewed the Solomon Islands crisis through the prism of 'ethnic conflict' requiring a traditional United Nations-style peacekeeping response. This changed markedly from mid-2002 as the ramifications of the 9/11 attacks and the Bush administration's War on Terror were assimilated into Australia's security policy thinking. It was only then that the armed ethnopolitical rivalry and criminal lawlessness in the Solomon Islands began to directly engage Canberra's reputational concerns. In the first half of 2003, the ongoing disorder in the Solomon Islands became indelibly linked with poor governance across the South Pacific region more broadly, thereby giving rise to a raft of potential transnational security threats*some arguably genuine though very minor, such as drug trafficking and money laundering, and others rhetorical, such as people smuggling and terrorism. The situation in the Solomon Islands*however limited*thus began to be viewed through the prism of the failed state discourses of the War on Terror.
Australia's 2003 intervention in the Solomon Islands 447
The June 5, 2000 coup in Honiara and the events leading up to it since late 1998 were regarded by Australian officials in the region as a serious escalation of the low-level disorder and poor governance that generally prevailed. The Howard government did immediately condemn the coup action, but soon came under criticism for having refused repeated requests from Honiara for Australian police. Howard was very clear at this time that post-colonial sensibilities had to be respected. The prime minister said on June 7 that: 'I don't think small Pacific Island countries like the idea of Australia presuming to rule the roost as the policeman of the region' (Prime Minister of Australia 2000). Downer ridiculed media calls for intervention, saying that the government would not be engaging 'in gunboat diplomacy every time an ethnic conflict erupted in the Asia-Pacific region' (Australian Associated Press, June 9, 2000). Prior to 9/11 and the rise of transnational security issues to the top of the international agenda, governance problems in the South Pacific did not resonate as a reputational concern for Australian policy makers.
In mid-2002, lawlessness and criminality in fragile states began to be linked with transnational terrorism, international order and the US alliance, predominantly by Defence Minister Robert Hill. Hill argued on June 18, 2002 that the 1990s concerns of 'ethnic, religious and separatist conflict' had now become intertwined with 'a range of transnational issues . . . such as organised drug smuggling, people smuggling and terrorism'. It had taken 'the tragic events of 11 September to reveal starkly the new contours and fault-lines of a very different strategic landscape'. The USA was 'clearly no longer going to allow problems to fester and threats to remain unresolved'. This was a position shared by Australia (Hill 2002) . The evidence suggests that the situation in the Solomon Islands only began to strongly engage Australia's reputational concerns in the emerging international order climate of the War on Terror.
By mid-2002, the Solomon Islands crisis was also attracting negative international attention, thereby directly damaging Australia's reputation. The European Commission and United Nations jointly released a major report on conflict in the South Pacific in June 2002. The report was highly critical of a number of Australia's initiatives in the Solomon Islands. It stated that the Australian-sponsored Townsville Peace Agreement of October 2000 was a failure (Retiere and Schurmann-Zeggel 2002, 7) . The Townsville Peace Agreement did not include all militia leaders in the peace process, nor did it include civil society representatives. Australia led an unarmed and neutral international peace monitoring team (IPMT) to support the peace process under the auspices of a local peace monitoring council. But arms decommissioning proved to be ineffective. The militias were reluctant to disarm without an impartial and effective police force in place. The IPMT departed on June 25, 2002 with an estimated 500 military-style weapons still at large (Fraenkel 2004, 142) . The European Commission/United Nations report observed that the IPMT was leaving the Solomon Islands not because its job was done, but because there was 'no genuine peace to monitor' (Retiere and Schurmann-Zeggel 2002, 23) . While there is no public mention of this report by Australian officials, it cannot have been favourably received by the Howard government, which was always sensitive to such international criticisms, especially from the United Nations.
The post-9/11 climate of transnational security threats was acutely heightened for Australia by the October 12, 2002 terrorist attacks in Bali, in which 88 Australians were killed. A series of violent and chaotic events occurred in Honiara in December 2002 against this wider backdrop of the War on Terror, Bali bombings and increasing international attention on the Solomon Islands. Police demanding 'compensation' fired on Prime Minister Kemakeza's house on December 13. Extortion payments were made, government ministers quit and Kemakeza survived a no-confidence motion in parliament. The political chaos of December was the catalyst for further proposals for intervention within government in Canberra and Wellington.
Downer revealed on June 10, 2003 that it was in December 2002 that he had started to realise that the situation was no longer tenable. He made direct reference to both Australia's special responsibility for the South Pacific and its international reputation in being seen to keep order in the region. Downer said: 'if we don't fix up Solomon Islands no-one will be able to. We're the only country with the capability to do this'. He then made the crucial point of reputation that 'the international community looks to Australia to ensure that the South Pacific is a stable part of the world'. Australia's responsibility to prevent state failure in the region was directly attributed to transnational threats: 'drug trafficking in particular, money laundering, people trafficking, all these sorts of activities could readily take place within the sovereign boundaries of a failed state' (DFAT 2003b) . This comment reflects the abovementioned shift in interventionist norms that occurred during the War on Terror.
Later on June 10, Downer launched an influential report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Our Failing Neighbour. The report declared that the Solomon Islands were 'a failing state'. They were well on the way to becoming 'effectively ungoverned', thereby giving rise to potential transnational threats (ASPI 2003, 6) . In referring to Australia's special responsibilities in the region, the report highlighted the connection between Australia's responsibility and its international reputation: state failure in the Southwest Pacific reflects badly on Australia. Other countries, including major allies and friends, expect Australia to take a leading role in this part of the world, and judge us in part on how well we discharge what they tend to see as our responsibilities here. Australia's standing in the wider world*including with the United States*is therefore at stake (ASPI 2003, 14Á15) .
Howard repeated in parliament on June 25 that the international community 'naturally and understandably expects Australia to play a leading role' (Parliament of Australia 2003, 17483Á17484) . In a television interview on the same day, Howard said again that: 'the rest of the world expects Australia to shoulder a lot of the burden because this is our part of the world, this is our patch' (Prime Minister of Australia 2003a). The designation of the South Pacific as 'our patch' was thereafter a prominent theme in Howard's rhetoric.
As the intervention became imminent, Howard repeatedly emphasised Australia's international responsibility for 'our patch' and the damage to the country's reputation if it failed to act decisively to restore order in the Solomon Islands. On the Nine Network's Today Show on July 23, 2003, Howard said, in a turn of phrase redolent of the Bush administration, that:
if we do nothing and the country slides into further anarchy and it then becomes a haven for evil doers, whether they're involved in terrorism or drugs or money laundering . . . we'll rightly be condemned, not only by the Australian people but also by countries around the world. This is our patch and we do have a special responsibility here ( 
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that the Howard government's primary motive for its intervention in the Solomon Islands was to bolster Australia's international reputation by fulfilling its responsibility to maintain regional order in the War on Terror. While a number of motives have been analysed previously in interpreting the decision making behind RAMSI, there has been no emphasis on reputation as the primary motive. Where it has been noted at all, reputation appears as a supplementary motive. This is despite it being stated by Howard and Downer with increasing explicitness and forcefulness in the weeks leading up to the intervention. The reputational motive is consistent with the War on Terror's political climate of threat perception, responsibility and risk management, and, indeed, provides the key to explaining how transnational security concerns at the global level could translate into Australian action in the peripheral South-West Pacific region, where any genuine empirical threat was negligible.
In demonstrating this argument, I first made the case that the Howard government had compelling historical justification for Australia's claim to a special responsibility to keep order and manage security threats in the SouthWest Pacific region on behalf of its traditional allies*at that time the 'coalition of the willing'. I then demonstrated the close connection between Australia's historical responsibility for maintaining order in its region and the reputational norms that developed during the War on Terror. These revolved around the prevention of state failure and transnational security problems through the promotion of good governance and capacity-building.
The evidence shows that, until mid-2002, Canberra viewed the crisis as one of ethnic conflict requiring a political settlement and traditional peacekeeping response. Canberra's reputational concerns only became engaged when the ongoing situation in the Solomon Islands began to resemble the emerging failed state and transnational security discourses of the War on Terror. Public statements focusing on the threat of terrorism, money laundering and people smuggling from the 'failing' state of the Solomon Islands were evident only after the October 2002 Bali bombings. In tandem with this, and increasing in emphasis in the weeks leading up to the intervention, were the repeated assertions that Australia's reputation vis-à -vis the USA and the international community would be damaged if it failed to keep order in its sphere of responsibility.
Throughout his tenure, Howard consistently identified Australia as an integral part of the liberal-democratic Western 'core' of the international community. In the period between 2001 and 2003, preventing state failure and transnational threats were at the top of the global security agenda among Western states. Performing these tasks in the Solomon Islands in line with the new interventionist norms of the War on Terror was viewed by Canberra as essential to maintaining Australia's international reputation. 
